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After 1945, American policy makers designed two different policies toward Korea: 
one was the trusteeship propelled by the State Department, the other was the plan of 
“an executive and administrative governmental agency” desig ed by the United 
States Military Government in Korea. In spite of the fact that the two policies had 
different meanings from the viewpoint of negotiations with the Soviets, the aims were 
same: a new Korean government that would maintain an amicable relationship with 
America and that would have effective control over the whole Korean Peninsula.  
This purpose was not changed until the Korean War. Moreover the Economic 
Cooperation Administration plan for South Korea was designed in order to allow 
Korea to rebuild its economic system. U.S. policymakers considered the ECA plan as 
the means for the improvement of South Korea’s viability and the containment of 
communism in the Free World as well as on the Korean P ninsula. Yet, U.S. policy to 
make the Korean economy closely connected with the Japanese was not designed until 
the end of the Korea War.  
After the Armistice Agreement in 1953, U.S. policy toward South Korea was 
changed. The changes came from the East Asian system as well as the world situation. 
Because of Japan’s successful economic reconstruction and China’s rise in Asia 
during the Korean War, American policy makers began to regard South Korea not 
only as a economic appendage to Japan, but also as a buffer zone between the 
Communist World and the Free World.  
Accordingly Korea’s military role was gradually strengthened, whereas its 
economic role was weakened. Despite the fact that the U.S. tried to reduce grants and 
the size of the Korean and American milit ries in South Korea, the significance of 
South Korea from the viewpoint of security continued to be stressed throughout 1950s. 
Therefore, the ‘unified policy’ and the conomic recovery plan were eliminated after 
the Korean War. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The Korean War shook the East Asian system as well as the Korean Peninsula. From the 
viewpoint of security, both the South Korean and Japanese Government joined “the Mutual 
Defense Treaty” and “the Security Treaty” with the U.S. during and after the Korean Wa . 
From the economic viewpoint, devastation from the war made the South Korean economy 
inviable, whereas the environment within which Japan regained economic health was 
dominated by decisions reached in connection with the San Francisco Peace Conference 
during the war (1951) (Reischauer & Jansen 1995: 413).  
The changes in the communist bloc also deserve attention. First of all, China gained 
hegemony in Asian communist movements through the Korean War because she 
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demonstrated her ability to wage a war against the world’s pre-eminent capitalist power 
without the Soviet Union, even though she could not secure a seat in the United Nation until 
the late 1960s. Despite of the economic devastation, the war provided the North Korean 
Government an opportunity to implement independent diplomatic strategy with China and 
Russia, because Russian military forces did not take part in the Korean War directly while 
Chinese power in the communist bloc increased.  
The position and the strategic value of the Korean Peninsula, of cour e, changed during 
the war through changes in the world situation as well as in the East Asian system. The U.S. 
policy makers tried to change their policies toward South Korea to reflect this new world 
situation.  
Nevertheless, existing works did not pay attention to the change. They defined Korea's 
place as well as Taiwan's place after World War II as Japanese appendages, just as they had 
done during the colonial period. In the colonial period, they supplied inexpensive rice to 
prevent the rapid rise of Japan's industrial wages and also served as markets for Japanese 
manufacturers. The U.S., they asserted, revived the colonial relationship between Japan and 
Korea after 1945. According to their assertion, the strategic value of the Korean peninsula 
did not change in the 1940s and the 1950s (Cuming 1984; Woo 1991). 
A few scholars tried to examine the Korea’s p sition in East Asia in the 1940s and the 
1950s from the viewpoint of U.S. foreign policy (Macdonald 1992; Yi 1995). Despite the 
fact that their xaminations were very helpful in understanding Korea’s position in East Asia, 
they did not compare the U.S. policies before and after the Korean War and did not examine 
the meanings of the change.  
It is important to illuminate U.S. policy changes before and a ter the Korean War from 
several viewpoints: (1)to find how two different policies of the U.S. State Department and 
the U.S. Military Government existed at the same time, (2)to understand whether the U.S. 
gave up the Korean Peninsula, and (3)to examine why America tried to phase-down Korean 
armed forces and American troops stationed in South Korea and at the same time why the 
policy was not carried out. These questions must be clarified through precise examination of 
the changes in U.S. policy and various U.S. plans from the economic and military viewpoint 
in the 1940s and the 1950s.  
 
     
2. ‘UNIFIED KOREA’S POLICY 
  
   2.1. Two Different Ways for One Purpose 
 
Before its liberation from Japan, the Korean Peninsula was a supplier of rice and a base 
for the war in China. Geographically, the southern region of the Korean Peninsula consists of 
more plains than the northern part, so agriculture was developed to a relatively greater extent.  
Accordingly, there were many conflicts between landlords and tenants in sou her  Korea 
ever since the Chosôn dynasty. Leftist power, therefore, was stronger in the south than in the 
north because the existing conflicts made it easier for leftists to influence the tenants during 
the colonial period.  
Conversely, modern industries were developed in the northern part of Korea because of 
Japan’s war preparations in the 1930s (Cumings 1997: 167- 70).1 Furthermore, northern 
                                                  
1 Japan is the only colonial power that located heavy industries such as steel, chemicals, 
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Korea, where many Chanban (fallen members of the ruling class) lived, was a conduit for 
importing Christianity from China. Therefore in the north there were manyconservatives, 
who were either commercial capitalists or Christians. Nevertheless, the general situation in 
the Korean peninsula meant that Kore  had one of Asia's oldest communist movements, 
making it convenient for Soviets to carry out their policies.  
This was the situation that the United States and the U.S.S.R. encountered when they 
occupied the Korean Peninsula. The U.S. planners began to worry about the implication of 
Soviet involvement in Korea in relation to the issue of Pacific security as early as 1942, 
within months of Pearl Harbor, and questioned whether a trusteeship would give the United 
States enough influence over Korean affairs (Foreign Relations of the United States 
[hereafter: FRUS] 1944 V: 1224-1239; FRUS 1945 VI: 1023).2 They feared that the Soviets 
would bring with them Korean guerrillas who had been fighting the Japanese in Manchuria, 
the numbers of which they grossly exaggerated (to as many as twenty thousand) (FRUS 1945 
VI: 1026-1027). 
Shortly after occupying the southern part of Korea the American Military Government in 
Korea (hereafter: ‘USAMGIK’) was perplexed by the situation that it found. In September 
15, a week after the American military was stationed in Korea, H. Merrell Benninghoff, the 
State Department’s Political Adviser to General Hodge, reported to Washington: "Sout ern 
Korea can best be described as a powder keg ready to explode at th  application of a spark. ... 
Korea is completely ripe for agitators (FRUS 1945 VI: 1049-1053)."  
In spite of the fact that the position of the U.S. in the Korean Peninsula was not as stable 
as the Soviet position, America tried to influence not only the southern region but the whole 
peninsula after the establishment of the independent Korean government. American policy 
makers designed two different structures: one was the trusteeship and the other was the plan 
of “an executive and administrative governmental agency.” The former was propelled by the 
State Department, the latter by the USAMGIK.  
It was not easy for the U.S., however, to carry out the plans because of the Russia’  
opposition to the U.S. and the Korea’s internal political dynamics. A key element of both 
plans was the reorganization of the politicians in the southern part of the Kore n Peninsula. 
In the case of the trusteeship policy, establishment of the ‘provisional democratic Korean 
government’ was the most significant factor according to the “Communiqué” agreed to at the 
Moscow Conference in December 27, 1945. In the “Communiqué,” article one prescribed the 
formation of the provisional democratic Korean government “which shall take all the 
necessary steps for developing the industry, transport and agriculture of Korea and the 
national culture of the Korean people.” Article two provided the establishment of “a Joint 
Commission consisting of representatives of the United States command in southern Korea 
and the Soviet command in northern Korea” in order to “assist the formation of a provisional 
Korean government.” In article three, although the trusteeship policy that the U.S. designed 
during the World War II appeared, it prescribed the trusteeship should be carried out “with
                                                                                                                      
and hydroelectric power in its colonies. In strategic terms, Korea, especially the northern 
region, was a natural base from which Japan could extend its influence into North China. 
2 In particular, various research papers on Korean problems were prepared in 1944 and 
1945 by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East, the Office of Far Eastern 
Affairs, and the Divisions of Japanese Affairs, Territorial Studies, and International Security 
and Organization. These papers cover a wide range of subjects on various aspects of political, 
economic, and security problems in Korea and the capacity of Kore  for independence.  
              TAE-GYUN PARK 92
the participation of the provisional Korean democratic government (FRUS 1945 VI: 1150-
1151).”3 
The USAMGIK considered the “Communiqué” as an unattainable policy because 
negotiation with the Soviets was thought impossible when leftist power in Korea was the 
dominant force. Therefore officials in the USAMGIK designed a plan for the U.S. to support 
rightist and conservative politicians in order to overwhelm the leftists.  
The plan was formed when a strong anti-communist politician, Syng-man Rhee returned 
as a political adviser to General MacArthur. The Acting Political Advisor in Japan, George 
Atcheson, suggested the need for a special political plan, namely 'an executive and 
administrative governmental agency’ shortly after a meeting with Rhee and General 
Command of USAMGIK, John Hodge (FRUS 1945 VI: 1091-1092). He believed that in 
spite of the fact this plan was “contrary to past American thinking” because the U.S. should 
“give open official approval or support to any one leader group or combination,” without the 
agency “our difficulties will increase rather than diminish, and the Communistic group set up 
and encouraged by the Soviets in northern Korea will manage to extend its influence into 
southern Korea with results which can readily be envisaged”.  
This plan was renamed by the Acting Political Adviser in Korea, Langdon. He remanded 
the organization, “a Governing Commission.” It was through this organization that the 
USAMGIK should provide “facilities, advice and working funds for such commission 
(FRUS 1945 VI: 1130-1133).” This revised plan was a more detailed one that consisted of 
five stages.  
Two policies, the trusteeship and the agency or the governing commission, had different 
meanings from the viewpoint of negotiations with the Soviets. The advisors designing the 
Governing Committee regarded the trusteeship as a hopeless one: “I favor another plan 
instead of trusteeship (FRUS 1945 VI: 1130-1133).” Nevertheless two policies were 
gradually combined with each other and played important roles during the USAMGIK and 
the U.S.-Soviet Joint Commission. As existing works mentioned, the Representative 
Democratic council of Southern Korea (Feb. 1946), the Right-Left Joint Commission (June 
1946), the Interim legislative assembly (Nov. 1946), the Interim Government (Feb. 1947) 
was established under the USAMGIK (Cumings 1981; Park 1992: 127-14 ). These 
organizations were established following Langdon’s five-stage plan and in response to Soviet 
action in the north.  
In spite of the difference, it is important to understand the commonality between the two 
policies. Even in the Governing Commission plan, expansion of the U.S. influence over the 
northern part was considered: “Somewhere in the transition … negotiations to be signed with 
Russia for mutual withdrawal of troops and extension to Russian zone of Governing 
Commission’s authority (FRUS 1945 VI: 1130-1133).”4  
                                                  
3 Furthermore, In the article two, there is a phrase, “In p eparing their proposals the 
Commision shall consult with the Korean democratic parties and social organization.” 
Originally, the state department of the U.S. designed the trusteeship supervised by four great 
powers, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, the United Kingdom and the United 
States, without the participation of the internal political power in Korea. Because the Soviet 
emphasized the role of the internal power, the U.S. could not help taking a step backward at 
the conference. 
4 Cumings regarded the plan for the purpose of establishing a separate government in 
Korea south of 38th parallel. Since the state department strongly opposed the Langdon’s 
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Because plans were not successful in light of the social dynamics in the southern,5 the 
American policy makers changed their policy goals to establish a separate government under 
authority of United Nations in late 1947. Almost all politicians in the South except the 
conservative politicians (Korean Democratic Party and Rhee Syng-Man) did not follow 
USAMGIK’s policy and did not participate in the establishment of a new government in 
1948. In particular, moderate politicians who the USAMGIK had tried to support in 1946, 
did not take part in the separate government, while they participated at the North-South 
Political Negotiation held in Pyongyang, North Korea in 1948, which was organized in order 
to oppose U.S. policy.  
In spite of the failure of the trusteeship policy, the U.S. did not give up its ultimate goal: 
establishment of the unified democratic government in the Korean Peninsula. Because of this 
goal, the U.S. did not design any specific economic plan during their occupation over the 
peninsula, and the South Korean government did not elect 100 seats in congress for northern 
part in 1948. In particular, that no economic plan appeared during the USAMGIK is very 
important. If the divided zones were unified, any economic plan in a separate region might 
be useless, the U.S. policy makers believed.  
     
2.2. Not Relief, But Recovery  
 
When the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff [hereafter: JCS] estimated what countries would be in 
the most urgent need of U.S. aid with respects to their viability and stability in 1947, Korea 
was ranked fifth in position among 18 countries. The top four consisted of Greece, Turkey, 
Italy and Iran. The countries that followed Korea in rank were France, Austria, Hungary, 
England, and Belgium. The only other Asian country besides Korea in the top 18 was the 
Philippines, which was ranked 13th. However, from the viewpoint of U.S. security, the JCS 
ranked Korea 13th among 16 countries. Korea's place was behind Japan (8th), Latin America 
(11th), and European countries like England, France, Germany, Austria, and Belgium6. After 
further discussions, the JCS strongly believed that the Korean Peninsula was not an 
appropriate place to wage a war against communist countries, and they recommended that 
the U.S. military in Korea should withdraw as soon as possible. These discussions were 
reflected in the U.S. policy towards the Republic of Korea in 1948 and 1949, called the 'NSC 
8' series.7 In fact, the American military did withdraw from South Korea in June 1949.
                                                                                                                      
intention, however, this plan was carried out in order to support U.S. position in the Joint 
Commision.  
5 The Joint Commission was prolonged and recessed for approximately one year, 
because of the social dynamics in the Korean Peninsula. The main point that te U.S. and 
Russia focused on was not the issue of unifying the divided zones or of establishing a new 
unified government, but instead the question of which politicians could participate in the 
Commission. Both occupation military leaders wanted politicians wh  they supported to take 
part in the Commission, but it was not easy because of the internal conflicts between right 
and left wing. 
6 "United States Assistance to Other Countries from the Standpoint of National 
Security," April 29, 1947, In Etzold & Gaddis, 1978, Containment: Documents on American 
Policy and Strategy, 1945~1950, New York: Columbia Univ. Press. 
7 Report by the National Security Council, “Position of the United States with Respect to 
Korea,” NSC 8, April 2, 1948, FRUS 1948, vol. VIII, pp. 1164-1169. 
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However, the opinions of the president and the State Department were quite different 
from the JCS and the Defense Department. The president and the State Department clearly 
argued that an ideological war was being waged in Korea, and that the Republic of Korea 
would play an important role in the Cold War. The Acting Secretary of State, Jam s Webb 
commented before the Senate hearings on June, 28, 1949: "we would hope that we can 
establish in South Korea a political and economic unit which would demonstrate the value of 
a free republican form of government."8 From this viewpoint, the Economic Cooperation 
Administration [hereafter: ECA]was responsible for U.S. assistance to South Korea instead 
of China in 1948, under the direct direction of President Truman. In spite of the fact that 
NSC 8 series recommended th  withdrawal of American forces,9 Truman and the State 
Department tried to delay the date of the withdrawal as much as possible. After the 
withdrawal, the U.S. left hundreds of military advisors in Korea, which was the largest 
contingent in the world at that time. 
The President and the Department of State derived their viewpoint from contempo ary 
circumstances: the loss of China and the Soviet atomic bomb. After World War II, the U.S. 
had to change their strategy to rearrange the capitalist system in Asia with China at the apex, 
because of the Chinese communists’ victory. In the PPS 28/2 General MacArthur believed 
that the U.S. should not consider the west coast of the U.S., but instead the east coast of Asia 
as the American west coast on the Pacific, and he argued that the U.S. should consider Japan 
as a military base from a strategic viewpoint.10 The NSC 49 series reflect the general shift in 
American policy towards Japan that was of en called 'the reverse course.’11 
The NSC 48 series was the basis for U.S. policy toward Asia in 1949. The document 
emphasized the roles of Japan and India in Asia, while economic, technical, and military aid 
to South Korea was stressed without linkage with Japan and India. It also considered both 
Southeast Asia and China to be Japan's economic appendages despite of the Communist 
victory.12 The NSC 68, which called for America's military expansion,13 d the NSC 48 
                                                  
8 Webb also said, "I can make one concluding paragraph, to the effect that the rest of 
Asia is watching us in Korea... By helping the Korean people to attain a stable economy on 
which to build a free and democratic government we will encourage millions of peoples in 
the East to retain their present faith in democracy and the principles for which America 
stands. If we fail we will provide a rallying cry by which the Communist leaders in all 
countries from Japan to India will attract more and more people to their cause.” Economi  
Assistance to China and Korea 1949-1950, with an introduction by Richard D. Challener, 
1979, The Senate Foreign Relations Committee's Historical Series, New York: Garland 
Publishing, Inc.,  pp. 120-121. 
9 The withdrawal of American military in South Korea was indispensable, because of the 
withdrawal of the Soviet troops in North Korea shortly after the establishment of a separate 
government. Another reasons are for the strategic consideration thatthe JCS-Korea would 
not be an appropriate place to wage a war against Russia, and for restraint of President 
Rhee's intention to attack North Korea. 
10 "Conversation between General of the Army MacArthur and Kennan," March 5, 1948,
In Etzold & Gaddis, ibid, pp. 228-230.  
11 "Strategic Evaluation of United States Security Needs in Japan," NSC 49, June 15, 
1949; "Department of State Comments on NSC 49," NSC 49/1, September 30, 1949, in 
Strategies of Containment. 
12 "The Position of the United States with Respect to Asia," NSC 48/1, Dec. 23, 1949; 
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series emerged out of the new world situation in 1949. 
With regards to Korea's place in the world, the NSC 48 series showed that t e opinions of 
the State Department and the ECA were quite different from those of the Defense 
Department and the JCS. As Cumings notes, the Defense Department considered Korea as an 
economic appendage of Japan because it sought to reorganize the Asian world system to 
strengthen Japan's role. As I cited in Webb's comments above, the State Department and the 
ECA opposed the Defense Department and emphasized Korea's ideological role in the Cold 
War. This difference was apparent in the discussion over construction plans for cement and 
fertilizer facilities in South Korea, which were targeted as import substitution industries.14 
Although several senators and bureaucrats were strongly opposed to the ECA’s plan for 
Korea because the plan might reduce Japan’s ex ort to South Korea, the U.S. government 
began to carry out he plan in the middle of 1950 shortly before the war (Park 1998: 99-
100).15 
In order to understand the characteristics of U.S. policy toward South Korea before the 
Korean War and to examine how U.S. policy makers considered the Korean-Japanese 
relationship, an economic viewpoint is necessary. Different from Cuming’s viewpoint that 
America tried to revive the colonial relationship, between Japan and Korea shortly after the 
World War II, the U.S. preferred South Korea’s independent reconstruction to close 
connection between Korea and Japan. The discussion on the ECA plan toward South Korea 
reflected this American policy.  
One of the American officials in the American Mission in Korea strongly opposed the 
ECA plan because U.S. assistance for facilities of cement and fertilizer might be useless 
considering Japan’s export capability.16 His view was consistent with that of the Department 
of the Army which attempted to view Japan as an opportunity to reduce U.S. responsibility in 
Asia. But Robert A. Kinney, an official in the ECA in Korea criticized the opinion: (1)South 
Korea could achieve foundations for self-supporting economy by FY 1953 if the ECA plan 
were carried out, (2)the purpose of the plan was not for industrialization, but to balance the 
budget, and (3)not Japan, but Russia might control over South Korea if the plan were not 
implemented because Koreans had strong anti-Japanese sentiment.17 
                                                                                                                      
"The Position of United States with Respect to Asia," NSC 48/2, Dec. 30, 1949, in Etzold & 
Gaddis, ibid, pp.251-276. 
13 "One of the most significant lessons of our World War II experience was that the 
American economy, when it operates at a level approaching full efficiency, can provide 
enormous resources for purposes other than civilian consumption while simultaneous 
providing a higher standard of living." "United States Objects and Programs for National 
Security," NSC 68, April 14, 1950. In Etzold and Gaddis, ibid, pp. 171- 97. 
14 The ECA Plan to South Korea was not a relief program, but a recovery or 
rehabilitation program in order to make Korean economy self-supporting in time. Economic 
Assistance to China and Korea 1949-1950, pp. 125-126. 
15 The debates on the NSC 61 series provide a good example of the differing opinions 
between the State and the Defense.  
16 David E. Bane, “Korean-Japanese Economic Relations,” Dec. 8, 1949, RG 469, box 
92.  
17 Kinney, “Comments on Mr. David Bane’s Analysis of ‘Korean-Japanese Economic 
Relations’,” no date, ibid. A memorandum produced by the Acting Secretary of State to the 
Director of the Bureau of Budget (Pace), dated in May 16, 1949, were consistent with 
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In the end, a paper published by the Division of Research for the Far East in the 
Department of State accepted the latter opinion. First, the paper commented that economic 
integration between Japan and Korea could potentially have no effect in reducing the budget 
deficit of the Korean government. This is because it would be impossible to increase Korea’  
export to Japan when Korea had no specific industries for export. Moreover considering 
inflation in South Korea, the unstable value of Korean currency might exert harmful 
influences on the Japanese Yen. As a result, the paper concluded that the independent 
economic assistance and economic reconstruction plan was preferrable to the integration 
project between the two countries.18  
U.S. economic policy on the relationship between Korea and Japan stemmed from U.S. 
policy that sought “[t]o effect a complete political and administrative separation of Korea 
from Japan and to free Korea from Japanese social, economic and financial control” under 
the USAMGIK (FRUS 1945 VI: 1073-1091). Although a policy that tried to connect the 
Korean economy closely with the Japanese by the Chief of the Division of Japanese and 
Korean Economic Affairs, Edwin O. Martin, had been mentioned in 1947 (FRUS 1947 VI: 
184-186), the policy had not been carried out at least until the Korean War broke out. A 
report drafted by Special Interdepartmental Committee on Korea in 1947 as well as SWNCC 
policy papers on Korea stressed the significance of the establishment of strong independent 
Korean economy free from domination by Japan or any foreign power as a necessary 
foundation for political independence (FRUS 1946 VIII: 712; FRUS 1947 VI: 616).”  
Another key point in order to understand U.S. policy shortly before the Korean War is the 
fact that the U.S. continued to maintain its ‘unified Korea’ policy. Even though the ECA plan 
was designed for the purpose of establishing an independent and self-supporting conomy, 
American policy makers did not give up the unification policy. In NSC 48, there is a key 
sentence as below:  
 
  Even with U.S. economic assistance here is no assurance that South Korea can 
be made economically self-sufficient so long as the peninsula remains truncated 
(FRUS 1948 VI: 973). 
 
The ‘unified Korea’ policy might be one of the reasons that the U.S. did not hesitate to 
cross the 38th parallel during the Korean War.  
In the long run, at least before the Korean War, the U.S. policy papers shows two 
significant goals: (1) to unify the Korean peninsula in order to establish a new government 
free from any foreign powers and (2) to foster conditions that will separate Korea from 
economic dependence upon Japan. 
 
 
3. CHANGES IN KOREA’S PLACE AFTER THE KOREAN WAR 
 
3.1. Korean Economy as a Appendage of Japanese 
 
                                                                                                                      
Kinney’s opinion. In particular, he alerted that if the ECA plan were not carried out, North 
Korea’s influence would expand seriously over South Korea because the Korean peninsula 
was waging a ideological war. 
18 “Korean-Japanese Economic Relation,” April 4, 1950, RG 59, Lot 58D245, box 4. 
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Throughout the 1950s, the Eisenhower Administration and Congress sought ways to 
reduce the U.S. budget deficit, which had increased tremendously because of the Korean War.  
Reducing foreign aid and replacing conventional forces with atomic weapons, which had the 
effect of decisively reducing military aid, were important means to balance the budget. As a 
result, the Eisenhower Administration reconsidered its grants toward South Korea, which 
was then the largest recipient of U.S. foreign aid in the Third World (Park 1999). 
In order to reduce U.S. aid to South Korea, three points were considered: to pha e-down 
the Korean military and reduce or withdraw U.S. military forces stationed in South Korea, to 
increase Japan’s regional economic and military role to lessen the U.S. burden toward South 
Korea and Southeast Asia, and to encourage South Korea to increase i s share in maintaining 
the South Korean armed forces through economic recovery and social stabilization (Park 
1999). 
In NSC 5514 superseding NSC 170/1, dated in February 25, 1955, there is no comment 
on economic reconstruction in the “Curr nt U.S Objective (FRUS 1955- 7 XXII: 44).” 
From the economic viewpoint, there were three comments in NSC 5514: 
 
(1) To establish living standards approximating the 1949-50 l vels, which the ROK 
should be able to support with a minimum of future external aid. 
(2) To increase the investment component as rapidly as is consistent with economic 
   stability, placing greatest emphasis on projects contributing most immediately to 
   increased productivity. 
(3) To permit the ROK to assume an increasingly greater proportion of the cost f 
   supporting its armed forces.   
 
In this citation, three points were stressed. First of all, instead of economic reconstruction, 
recovery from the devastation of the war was emphasized. This is quite different from the 
purpose of the ECA plan before the war. Second, although investment was considered 
important, the key emphasis was placed on economic stability. Lastly, the purpose of the 
economic assistance was not to rehabilitate, but to make a greater financial contribution to its 
own development while continuing to provide support for its military forces. These three 
points were not to increase or to reduce U.S. assistance toward South Korea.  
NSC 5702/2 contains a clause concerning technical assistance and support to agricultural 
regions, along with a provision for increased participation by domestic and foreign private 
investors in South Korean economic development. On the other hand, NSC 6018 reflects a 
variety of modifications: (1) change from 'a self-supporting economy' to 'a self-supporting, 
growing economy'; (2) inclusion of 'Economic Development and Programs for Reform and 
Development' under 'Major Policy Guidance'; and (3) advocating a reform of exchange rate 
and stimulation of production for export and domestic demands (FRUS 1958-1960 XVIII : 
699-707; Woo 1991: 70- 1).19  
Nevertheless, it is not easy to find significant changes in the basic economic ideas of the 
two policy documents. First of all, they both stress that stimulation of industrial capacity 
should be consistent with economic stabil zation. Even if there is some variation in details 
concerning agriculture, fishery, community works, transportation, technical education, social 
reform, and other areas, in the two documents all industries are given similar consideration 
                                                  
19 Woo assesses NSC 6018 as an undergraduate textbook on comparative politics, or 
more precisely, modernization theory.  
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and neither contains any clear industrialization strategy. In NSC 5817, it is clear that U.S. 
economic and technical aid to Korea was designed for the sake of contribution to the support 
of ROK military forces (FRUS 1958-60 XVIII: 488). 
In NSC 6018, clauses fifteen, sixteen, and seventeen are concerned with economic 
development, and all of them stress a balanced national budget, which is closely linked to 
inflation and economic stabilization programs. The matter concerning the excha ge rate was 
closely related to the reduction of U. S. grants to South Korea because the Rhee 
Administration sought to get more dollars through overvaluation of Korean currency. 
Stimulating exports through a realistic adjustment of the exchange rate was of secondary 
concern to the U.S. and the basic objective of increasing export was merely to balance the 
budget of the South Korean government. 
The U.S. maintained tight controls over currency expansion in South Korea to stabilize 
inflation. Along with the Stabilization Program, the U.S. reduced two divisions of the Korean 
Army and one division of the U.S. army stationed in South Korea in the late 1950s. There 
were no plans for economic development that called for an increase in the South Korean 
currency supply.20 American officials who were concerned with South Korean affairs 
believed that an economic development plan would fuel inflation, and this view continued to 
be expressed in important policy documents until 1960. 
Among three points as I mentioned above, the biggest difference of U.S. policy in the 
1950s compared to that before the Korean War, is the attempt to closely link the Korean and 
Japanese economies. During the Korean War, the fact that Japan accomplished a major 
recovery is well known. After the war, in accordance with its 'New Look' strategic policy, the 
U.S. sought to reorganize the Asian capitalist world with Japan as the key focus in Asia. 
Following Japan's successful recovery, increasing Japan's regional military and economic 
roles was a means to ease the U.S.' commitments in South Korea and the rest of East Asia, as 
well as a means to reduce the U.S. budget deficit.21 In fa t Japan was remilitarized in a 
limited way as a result of the Korean War. In the end, U.S. policy makers in the 1950s started 
to regard South Korea as well as other Asian countries as economic appendages of Japan. 
The rise of Japan in Asia affected South Korea from the economic viewpoint. Because of 
Japan's successful recovery, the necessity for Korea's economic reconstruction became less 
of an urgent matter to America. Rather the U.S. sought to shift its burden by making Korea 
Japan's responsibility. Accordingly, throughout the 1950s in U.S. policy papers, there was 
little attention paid to economic rehabilitation in South Korea, and the focus was on relief 
from the devastation f the Korean War in spite of the fact that they used ‘recovery’ and 
‘rehabilitation’ instead of ‘relief.’ Almost all of the American aid to South Korea in the 
1950s consisted of consumption goods and theKorean government used the available 
counterpart funds to build up the military rather than f cilita e conomic growth.22 
                                                  
20 In the years following 1948, there were many economic development plans: Five-Y ar
Economic Rehabilitat on (1949, 1951), Five-Year Economic Development Plan by the 
Department of Rehabilitation (1956), Three-Y ar Economic Development Plan by the 
Economic Development Committee (1958), the Nathan Report by UNKRA (1953), and the 
Tasca Report by the U.S.(1953). None of them were carried out. 
21 “U.S. Policy Toward Japan,” NSC 5516, March 29, 1955; “U.S. Policy in the Far 
East,” NSC 5913/1, September 25, 1959, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, 
EO 12856, NA. 
22 The American Economic Coordinator totally controlled the counterpart funds after the 
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U.S. policy to normalize Korean-Japanese relationship from the economic viewpoint 
occurred in NSC 5514. In NSC 5702/2, the normalization was specialized in the clause 18: 
“Encourage the ROK to take the necessary steps toward normal commercial relations with 
other Free World countries, particularly Japan (FRUS 1955- 7 XXIII: 493). This clause 
continued in NSC 5817 and NSC 5907 (FRUS 1958-60 VXIII: 576). In the clause 21 of the
NSC 6018, the U.S. policy makers stressed more obviously the Japan’  role as below: 
 
“Encourage the development of cooperative relations, mutual respect and 
participation in multilateral activities as between the ROK and other free nations, 
especially Japan and other nations of Asia, as a means of lessening the dependence of 
the ROK upon the United States (FRUS 1958-60 XVIII: 703).” 
 
In the long run, the aims of economic rehabilitation in NSC papers in the 1950s did not 
mean to build an independent economy from Japan. On the contrary, America considered the 
Korean economy as an appendage of the Japanese. The economic purpose of U.S. assistance 
was no more than to relieve wartime devastation and to enlarge Korea’s responsibility for its 
own armed forces while simultaneously reducing U.S. assistance. This meant the role of 
South Korea as window dressing for the ideological battlefield before the war was no more 
valid under the New Look policy of the Eisenhower Administration.  
 
   3.2. Buffer Zone 
 
After the Korean War, China, along with Japan, increased its importance in Asian affairs. 
The fact that the Chinese army, not the Russians, had waged war against America made 
Communist China the master of the Asian Communist world. Although faced with many 
problems during the 1950s, such as the need for economic reconstruction, the Chinese 
communist regime began to strengthen its power not only in internal matters but in the 
external world as well. The approval of the Kennedy-Cooper Resolution in the Senate in 
1959 was an attempt to increase India's power to exert containment against the Chinese 
communists.23 Accordingly, the U.S. tried to isolate China from the rest of the world and 
kept it from joining the United Nations. 
Following China's rise, the strategic value of the Korean Peninsula had strengthened.  
What was different from the situation before the Korean War was that the U.S. had to 
consider Chinese military power when their policy makers designed U.S. security policy in 
Asia. Until 1958, the year when the Chinese army withdrew from North Korea, the size of 
                                                                                                                      
Agreement on Economic Coordination in 1952. The Office of Economic Coordinator played 
a key role in making economic policy in the 1950s. 
23 The Kennedy-Cooper Resolution was not an official policy of the Eisenhower 
Administration. The Resolution stemmed from opposition against the Eisenhower 
Administration's policy toward the Third World. Since the middle of 1950s, John F. Kennedy 
was in touch with academic circles that asserted the significance of economic containment, 
and many academics like W.W. Rostow were employed as advisers or bureaucrats in the 
State Dept. shortly after his inauguration in 1961. William O. Walker III, "Mixing the Sweet 
with the Sour: Kennedy, Johnson, and Latin America," in Di ne B. Kunz, ed., The 
Diplomacy of the Crucial Decade: American Foreign Relations During the 1960s (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1994), pp. 44-45. 
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Chinese army was a serious consideration in policy papers on the Korean Peninsula (FRUS
1955-1957 XXIII: 42-48; FRUS 1955-1957 XXIII: 491-498; FRUS 1958-1960 XVIII: 485-
491; FRUS 1958-1960 XVIII: 571-579). That meant that Korea became “a buffer zone” 
between China and Japan. 
Of course, American policy makers tried to phase-d wn South Korean military and U.S. 
armed forces stationed in South Korea during the 1950s, as existing works mentioned 
(Macdonald 1992; Yi 1995; Park, Tae-Gyun 1999). However, the JCS strongly opposed the 
reduction of the Korean military was because the Chinese Army was stationed in North 
Korea.24 While the U.S. tried to reduce South Korean armed forces in order to decrease 
American assistance of which main role was to maintain South Korean military, the option of 
modernizing weapons was always considered. At last, the U.S. abolished article 13-d of the 
Armistice Agreement in 1958 and deployed nuclear missiles on the Korean peninsula (FRUS 
1955-1957 XXIII: 432-433, 460-461). 
U.S. consideration on Chinese power gradually increased during the 1950s. While NSC 
5514 stressed ‘preventing or countering the resumption of fighting by the ROK’ against 
North Korea and Communist China, in NSC 5702 the comments were at some extent strong 
as below:  
 
If Communist Chinese military power participates in or supports a Communist 
renewal of Korean hostilities, take direct military action against such participating or 
supporting power, wherever located, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]25 
as required to achieve U.S. objectives. In such operations make clear our intent to 
limit Korean hostilities and seek to avoid provoking or inviting Soviet Intervention. In 
addition: 
(1) Clarify to all, the necessity of direct military action against Communist China 
as the only feasible way of honoring our collective security commitments to the UN 
and our security commitments to the ROK 
(2) Call on other UN members for effective military assistance appropriate to 
direct military action against Communist China. 
 
Furthermore the formal role of South Korean forces changed after the Korean War. NSC 
8/2 in 1949 had limited the role as the capability of assuring internal security. However, the 
role of ROK military together with U.S. forces in Korea after the Korean War was d fi ed to 
be capable of “(1)deterring or successfully resisting aggression from North Korean forces 
alone, and (2)deterring aggression by North Korean forces and Chinese Communist forces 
now estimated to be in North Korea, or, with limited U.S. outside supp r , conducting a 
successful holding operation against such forces(FRUS 1955~1957 XXIII : 491-492).” 
Thus, the role of ROK forces gradually expanded in the late 1950s. Though the 
multilateral security project including ROK forces had been considered since 1955, the 
active boundary of the South Korean military had been limited within the Korean peninsula. 
However, since 1958, the role was expanded as below: 
                                                  
24 The fact that payments for the Korean military were not as expensive as other 
countries was another reason to oppose the reduction. Another reason is that reduction of the 
Korean army might worsen the unemployment problem in South Korea. 
25 Considering another cases, this declassified line might be a comment on nuclear 
weapon.  
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f. Encouraging the conditions necessary to form, and then participating in, a 
Western Pacific collective defense arrangement, including the Philippines, Japan, the 
Republic of China and the ROK, eventually linked with ANZUS and SEATO.(NSC 
5817) 
 
d. Maining ROK forces capable of assuring internal security and, together with 
U.S. forces in Korea and such outside U.S. combat and logistic supp rt as is readily 
available, capable of … (3) exercising the degree of power and range of capabilities 
sufficient to demonstrate throughout Asia the continuing determination of the 
Republic of Korea to oppose Communist aggression. (NSC 5907)
 
7. ROK armed forces capable of assuring internal security and together with U.S. 
forces and logistic support available in the Far East, deterring Communist aggression 
in Korea or of successfully resisting such aggression until Free World assistance can 
be brought into action. (NSC 6018) 
 
In NSC 6018, the position of South Korea as a buffer zone was quite clearer than before. 
Korea’s place in East Asia was considered not from the viewpoint of psychological warfare, 
but from the viewpoint of Free World security. In the major policy guidance of NSC 5817, 
U.S. policy makers believed that if the Communist bloc succeeded in extending its control 
over the whole of Korea, Free World ‘security’ in the Northeast Asia area would be seriously 
undermined.  
Another reason why te value of the Korean Peninsula rose in strategic terms was th  
Formosa Crisis and the U.S. intervention in Vietnam in the 1950s. American policy makers 
thought that the Chinese communists might support the communists in Southeast Asian 
countries. Furthermore, the Formosa Crisis was a direct threat to Taiwan, where the U.S. 
dispatched Seventh Fleet shortly after outbreak of the Korean War. Conflicts between the 
U.S. and Communist China over the Taiwan Straits had a direct impact on the Korean 
Peninsula, where both militaries were stationed (FRUS 1955- 7 XXIII: 217-220).26 
The Eisenhower Administration faced a dilemma between the ‘New Look’ policy and the 
containment of Communist China. Bec use the two policies attached different values to 
Korea, disputes in the Eisenhower Administration ensued between the proponents of the 
‘New Look’ and those who argued for the containment of Chinese Communists within the 
administration.27 
After the shock of Russia’s Sputnik in the late 1950s, President Eisenhower said: 
 
It seemed clear to him that we could not consider the Republic of Korea in a 
vacuum. It had to be considered in the context of the world situation. To illustrate his 
point, the President read a portion of a cable just received this morning on the most 
                                                  
26 Conversation at the 276th Meeting of the National Security Council showed clearly the 
relationship between the Formosa problem and the security of South Korea.  
27 “Discussion at the 297th Meeting of the National Security Council,” Thursday, 
September 20, 1956, NSC Series, Papers as President of the United States, 1953-61(Ann 
Whitman File), Box 8, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library; “Discussion at the 311th Meeting of 
the National Security Council,” Thursday, January 31, 1957, ibid. 
              TAE-GYUN PARK 102
recent discussion between Averell Harriman and Khrushchev.... This kind of 
intelligence meant to the President that we could not sit down and coolly calculate 
whether the ROK was to have 16 or 18 divisions without regard to other situations in 
the world. The Presid nt strongly emphasized this view that the U. S. could not afford 
to be weak anywhere... The President insisted that he was not arguing that it was 
necessarily wrong to reduce ROK forces, but he did insist that there was a real danger 
that the U. S. would display weakness in too many critical places in the world.  
While said the President, he realized that we were trying to match the Soviets in 
missiles, we could not afford to let ourselves become weak in other areas of the 
struggle with the Russians.28 
 
Another change in U.S. policy toward Korea was to give up the mmediat ‘unified 
Korea’ policy. Throughout the 1950s, unification policy had appeared in the ‘long-range 
objective’ and ‘major policy guidance,’ not in the ‘current U.S. objective.’ This is seriously 
different from the policy before the Korean War, as I mentioned in Chapter 2. This meant 
that unification of the Korean Peninsula was impossible, at least in the near future, American 
policy makers believed. They thought, “there is little prospect of Communist agreement on 
any reasonable formula for establishment of a unified democratic Korean state(FRUS 1958-
1960 XVIII : 486, 574),” and did not want to wage another war in order to unify the 
peninsula.29 
This showed very well in the clauses related to economic assistance or rehabilittion. Any 
comments on economic reconstruction related to unification had never appeared in the policy 
papers after the Korean War. From the viewpoint of the unified Korea policy, it might be also 
possible to illuminate the reason why American policy makers atte pt d to connect the 
Korean economy with the Japanese. Because economic cooperation between South and 
North Korea was impossible, the economic viability of Korea needed to be guaranteed by 
Japan. 
 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
The Korean War played a pivotal role in transforming Korea's place in East Asia. The 
U.S. occupied and established the military government until the establishment of the ROK 
government. America intervened in South Korea through the United Nations and gave ECA 
assistance during this period in rder to carry out the ideological war. Regardless of the 
likelihood, the U.S. tried to unify the Korean Peninsula and designed an economic 
reconstruction program with the idea of future unified Korea.  
After the Korean War the rise of Japan and China had two ifferent meanings for Korea's 
place in East Asia: as an economic appendage of Japan and as a buffer zone between Japan 
and China. From the economic viewpoint, the role of Korea became less important than 
                                                  
28 “Discussion at the 411th Meeting of the National Security Council,” bid., p. 565. 
29 The Everready Plan was one of outstanding case to be sure that the U.S. did not want 
to resume the war. The plan was designed in order to keep the Rhee Government from 
resuming the War. If a war resumed by the Korean government, America tried to remove 
high ranking officers including the president in South Korea. FRUS 1952-1954 XV part I: 
pp.965-968) 
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before, while from the viewpoint of military stra egy, Korea had become more important. As 
a result, America stationed its army on the peninsula after the Korean War, whereas 
economic grants grew smaller during the 1950s. Whenever disputes over the U.S. military’s 
withdrawal arose, the Chinese presence and the intentions of the South Korean Government 
to march north influenced the outcome. 
After the inauguration of President Kennedy, another objective was added to new U.S. 
policies toward underdeveloped countries. The Kennedy Administration adopted a new 
policy toward underdeveloped countries: economic development assistance. Rostovian new 
thinking forced the Third World to carry out social reforms and economic development plans. 
South Korea was not an exception. The U.S. regarded Korea not only as a buffer zone, but 
also as a showcase for the ideological war. 
To reexamine changes in U.S. policies toward South Korea before and after the Korean 
War has very significant meanings. First of all, the ECA plan provides the necessary 
background information to estimate whether the U.S. gave up the Korean Peninsula before 
the Korean War. The U.S. tried to contain communist effects by using psychological and 
economic means, as it had implemented in Western Europe, which was not for relief but for 
recovery.  
Second, the ‘unified Korea’ policy made it possible for the United States policy makers 
to decide to cross the 38th parallel in October 1950. Since the beginning of occupations by 
the U.S. military in 1945, American policy makers designed U.S. policy toward the Korea 
from the viewpoint of the whole peninsula, not as a divided region. Therefore, America 
considered the possibility that the Korean Peninsula would be unified in the near future when 
they designed the ECA plan.  
Third, new policies toward South Korea under the Eisenhower Administration explains 
the background of the U.S. phase-down policy of Korean armed forces and American troops 
stationed in South Korea throughout the 1950s. At the same time, it is possible to understand 
the reason why the phase-down policy was not carried out. Between the New Look and the 
containment postures against Communist China, it was not easy for U.S. policy makers to 
reduce forces in South Korea in the 1950s although two divisions of South Korean Army 
were reduced. 
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